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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INSURANCE
SEVERABILITY OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Plaintiff, assignee of a life insurance contract with disability
clause, sued for breach of the life insurance feature. The policy pro-
vided for, separate premiums, one for disability insurance and the
other for life insurance. In a previous suit the insured had recov-
ered for breach of the disability clause. Held, life insurance and dis-
ability clause constituted two distinct contracts and assignee had a
separate cause of action. Armstrong v. Illinois Bankers Life Associa-
tion, 29 N. E. (2d) 415 (Ind. 1940).
The court, in declaring the contract severable, relies upon the
facts that the risk upon the two types of insurance is different and
the consideration is apportioned. Since the contract is severable, there
are two causes of action and a recovery for disability benefits in a
previous suit is not res judicata to a suit for life insurance. Rosso v.
New York Life Insurance Company, 157 Miss. 469, 128 So. 343, 69
A. L. R. 883, 889 (1930).
The test most frequently applied by the courts to determine sev-
erability in contract cases is whether the consideration is entire or
apportioned. Thompson v. Fesler, 74 Ind. App. 80, 123 N. E. 188
(1920). In a previous case with facts similar to the principal case,
an Indiana court denied recovery on the consideration test, since a
single premium was paid. Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Carnithan,
62 Ind. App. 567, 109 N. E. 851 (1916). In fire insurance cases the
courts have adopted a further test that where the risk on one insured
item is affected by the risk on the other insured item, the contract
is entire. Havens v. The Home Insurance Co., 111 Ind. 90, 12 N. E. 137
(1887). The risk test now seems to be applied to supplement the
consideration test in life insurance policies with disability clauses.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Barry, 213 Ind. 56, 10 N.E. (2d) 614
(1937). In fire insurance policies the risk test alone is sufficient to
declare a contract severable even where the premium is single. The
Phenix Insurance Co. of Brooklyn v. Pickel, 119 Ind. 155, 21 N. E.
546 (1889). The principal case is in accord with other jurisdictions
declaring the contract severable on the test of consideration. Rosso v.
New York Life Insurance Company, 157 Miss. 469, 128 So. 343, 69
A. L. R. 883 (1930). The inclusion of the risk test is, however, unique
and in view of the Carnithan case, it is doubtful if the test would be suf-
ficient, by itself, to make the contract severable. A.M.H.
LABOR
LABOR BOARD BACK PAY ORDERS
The National Labor Relations Board, having found petitioner had
wrongfully discharged employees, ordered reinstatement of employees
with back-pay, less monies received by them, during period of dis-
charge, from labor upon work relief projects. The Board further or-
dered petitioner to make payment of this deducted amount to the
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fiscal agencies of government which had supplied funds for the work
relief projects. On petition for writ of certiorari, held: order should
be enforced with reimbursement provision eliminated. Such provision
is punitive and therefore exceeds power granted to Board by Congress.
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 61 S. Ct. 77 (1940).
The Board in ordering reimbursement to WPA relied upon section
10(c) of the NLRA which provides that the Board shall order "such
affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or with-
out back-pay, as will affectuate the policies of this act." 49 STAT.
454 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. 160(c) (Supp. 1938). Such order was thought
to redress a public loss and deny employer opportunity of shifting to
government the burden of supporting wrongfully discharged employees.
In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 NLRB 219 (1938). A similar order was
upheld in Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F. (2d) 587
(C.C.A.3d, 1940) upon the basis that the order was reasonable, but
the validity of another was denied upon the ground that WPA is
not charity and an employer should not be compelled to assume the
burden of public improvement. NLRB v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 111 F. (2d)
619 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). Cf. NLRB v. Tovrea Packing Co., 111 F. (2d)
626 (C.C.A. 9th, 1940). The decision in the principal case was pri-
marily based upon the doctrine that an NLRB order must not be puni-
tive. NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F. (2d) 862, 872 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
The words "penal" and "penalty" have been used in various senses.
Strictly and primarily, they denote punishment, whether corporal or
pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense
against its laws. Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U. S. 657, 666 (1892).
But they are also commonly used as including an extraordinary lia-
bility to which the law subjects the wrongdoer in favor of the person
wronged, not limited to the damages suffered. O'Sullivan v. Felix,
233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914). The court in the principal case seemed to
regard the NLRB order as being punitive in the strict sense. The
court said, "The Act is essentially remedial. It does not carry a
peual program declaring the described unfair labor practices to be
crimes. The Act does not prescribe penalties or fines . . . .Republic
Steel Corp v. NLRB, supra at p.79. However, in NLRB v. Remington
Rand, supra at p.872, the court declared punitive, and hence invalid, an
NLRB order which required an employer to furnish transportation
to certain employees. That order could not have been punitive in
the strict sense. The order neither provided for payment of a fine to
government nor for corporal punishment. Cf. U.S. v. Reisinger, 128
U.S. 398 (1888); Iowa v. Chicago R. Co., 37 Fed. 497 (1889). It would
seem, therefore, that an NLRB order is invalid if punitive in either
the strict or liberal sense of the word.
Perhaps more satisfactory decisions would be rendered if courts
discarded the "punitive-remedial" test and relied only upon a test
based upon the legislative intent, as expressed in floor debate by
Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor
which considered the bill, that the Act and orders thereunder should
go no further than the employer-employee relationship. See 79 CONG.
REC. 7659 to 7661 (1935). This test would adequately cover the sit-
uation in the principal case. P. C. M.
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